Llm-Observability on lo0 — Tech Blog

eBPF in local inference and statistical drift detection: closing the LLM observability loop in 2026

Wed, 20 May 2026 09:00:00 +0200

TL;DR

Tracing, evals, guardrails, MCP observability: the layers we have already covered see what is happening right now. What they do not see is what changes silently: the agent that answered well last week and this week, without anyone touching anything, answers slightly worse. What they also do not see is the fine mechanics of local inference: why a llama.cpp on an edge device takes 200 ms when it should take 100, which specific runtime function is the bottleneck. This post closes the two series of the week with the two layers that were missing: eBPF applied to local inference (uprobes on llama.cpp, vLLM, libcudart.so, integrated hardware perf counters, with <4% overhead, formalised in the ProfInfer 2026 paper, which is to local inference what Hubble is to the network) and statistical analysis of agent flows to detect drift before your user notices it (KS, PSI, MMD, embedding-space clustering, with Evidently AI, NannyML and WhyLabs as the dominant tools). The three types of LLM drift in 2026, prompt drift, model drift and eval-score drift, demand different tests. The complete stack (tracing, evals, guardrails, MCP observability, eBPF observability, drift detection) forms the loop that any serious agentic system needs in order to operate with a real SLA rather than with hope.

This post closes two series: the post-tracing series (Evals, Guardrails, MCP observability) and the eBPF series (eBPF from zero to Cilium, Tetragon, Hubble, AgentSight). It brings the two threads together: eBPF applied to the local inference engine plus statistical analysis of the flows that every layer produces.

The analogy: the agent’s cardiogram

A doctor who only looks at acute symptoms, the patient arrives with a high fever and you have to act, is practising reactive medicine. To practise preventive medicine, they need time series: blood pressure every year, cholesterol every six months, an ECG when there is a suspicion. It is not “right now” information, it is information about how something that should be stable is evolving. When a time series deviates from its baseline, you investigate before it turns into a high fever.

The LLM observability layers we have seen so far are reactive medicine: tracing tells you what happened in a specific conversation; evals tell you whether that conversation was good; guardrails tell you whether there was a specific threat; MCP observability tells you which tools were invoked and how. They all look at events, not trends.

Drift detection is preventive medicine. It looks at time series, of prompt embeddings, of evaluation scores, of distributions of generated tokens, and fires alerts when something drifts away from its normality. It does not tell you “this answer is bad”; it tells you “the distribution of prompts over the last 6 hours does not look like the distribution of the last month”. There you decide whether to investigate.

And the other half of the post, eBPF in local inference, is the equivalent of the MRI scanner: once you know there is a problem, it lets you see the inside of the model at a resolution no external wrapper gives you. To see which specific runtime function is slow, which CUDA kernel is the bottleneck, how tokens move through the internal buffers before going out to the client.

The two together close the loop: the time series detect that something is wrong, the scanner locates where.

Part 1 — eBPF applied to local inference

Why local inference changes the game

When the LLM runs locally, vLLM on a Kubernetes node, llama.cpp on an edge device, Ollama on a workstation, MLX on macOS, and not behind an external API, observability changes shape:

You control the binary: you can attach hooks that would otherwise be impossible.
The internal buffers exist in accessible RAM: the output-token stream, the logits, the KV caches, the scheduler structures are right there, at addresses a uprobe can read.
There is no cable to sniff: AgentSight’s analogy with SSL hooks does not apply because there is no TLS; the model answers you with an in-process function return, not with an HTTPS response.
The distance between kernel and model is minimal: the CUDA kernels running attention are one syscall deep; eBPF can observe both sides of that boundary with the same tracer.

This opens up a class of observability that is structurally impossible with LLM-as-a-service (the Anthropic, OpenAI or Vertex APIs). For apps serving inference on-premise or on-edge, an inference cluster, a mobile device, an RTX 4090 server in the rack, it is a new layer.

ProfInfer: the paper that formalises the pattern

ProfInfer (arxiv 2601.20755, 2026) is the reference academic piece that systematises what the ecosystem had been doing ad-hoc. The paper’s subtitle says it all: An eBPF-based Fine-Grained LLM Inference Profiler.

What it proposes:

Attaching uprobes dynamically to runtime functions of engines such as llama.cpp (and by extension vLLM, Ollama). No recompiling, no modifying the source code. It is like bpftrace for LLM inference.
Combining runtime events with hardware performance counters. A uprobe tells you when llama_decode runs; a hardware counter tells you how many floating-point instructions executed while it was inside. The correlation between the two is what gives the fine resolution.
<4% measured overhead under real workloads. That is a production-grade cost.
Visualisations in three views: operators (which tensor operations ran), graphs (how they relate) and timelines (when).

The paper focuses particularly on models on mobile platforms (Llama served on a Pixel or an iPhone), where classic observability with Prometheus and exported metrics barely exists. But the pattern applies to any local inference.

Where to hook: the map by engine

Now to the detail of the hooks. The target functions vary by engine:

llama.cpp

llama.cpp is pure C++, with symbols visible in the binary. The typical hooks:

llama_decode: the function that runs one inference pass (processes the current batch). Spans for latency per iteration, tokens processed.
llama_token_to_piece: converts a token ID to text. A hook here captures the stream of generated tokens before returning to the caller. It is the local equivalent of the SSL uprobes: you see the model’s output before it even reaches the consumer.
llama_get_logits: reads the logits of the last decode. If you want to record the model’s probabilities (not just the chosen token), here.
ggml_compute_forward_* (several functions): the operation kernels (matmul, attention, layernorm). Hooks for per-operation profiling.
ggml_backend_*: the backend functions (CPU, Metal, CUDA, ROCm). Hooks here break down the cost per device.

An example with bpftrace:

# Latency and count of llama_decode
bpftrace -e '
uprobe:/path/to/llama-server:llama_decode {
 @start[tid] = nsecs;
}
uretprobe:/path/to/llama-server:llama_decode /@start[tid]/ {
 @decode_lat = hist((nsecs - @start[tid]) / 1000);
 delete(@start[tid]);
}
'

Output: a histogram of decode latencies in microseconds. Zero modification to the binary.

vLLM

vLLM is mostly Python. The C/CUDA symbols live in its native extensions (vllm._C, vllm._moe_C). The typical hooks:

uprobes on vllm._C.* for custom operators (the paged attention kernel, the sampling kernel).
uprobes on libcudart.so and libcuda.so to capture cudaMalloc, cudaLaunchKernel, cudaMemcpy. This maps the cost of host↔device transfers and kernel launches.
Python tracepoints with bpftrace over usdt points: vLLM does not expose native static tracepoints, but they can be placed with USDT (dtrace style) at strategic points in the scheduler.

vLLM also exposes native Prometheus metrics (vllm:num_requests_running, vllm:gpu_cache_usage_perc, and so on). The added value of the eBPF approach is going down from the scheduler’s metrics to the individual functions: when a request is slow, seeing whether it was prefill, decode, scheduler overhead, transfer or synchronisation.

CUDA in general

Independently of the engine, uprobes on libcudart.so capture all the CUDA activity of the process:

cudaMalloc(size) → tracking of device memory allocations.
cudaLaunchKernel(func, ...) → spans for each kernel launch.
cudaMemcpyAsync(dst, src, size, kind) → host↔device transfers.
cudaStreamSynchronize(stream) → synchronisation points (where the host waits for the device).

This gives you a complete timeline of CUDA activity without needing NVIDIA Nsight Systems (which is excellent but heavy and oriented towards development, not continuous production).

Hardware counters: the other half

eBPF can read performance counters from the CPU/GPU’s PMU (Performance Monitoring Unit). That includes instructions executed, cache misses, branch mispredictions and, on GPUs with support, FLOPS, SM occupancy, HBM bandwidth.

Combining:

uprobe: “llama_decode ran from T1 to T2 with tokens=4”.
perf counter: “during that window, L2 cache misses = 15,000, instructions = 2.3 million”.

This lets you answer: why is it slow? Is it memory-bound (many cache misses), compute-bound (all the instructions in the FPU), bandwidth-bound (a lot of data movement)? State of the art for professional profiling.

Comparison with AgentSight

There are two eBPF products for LLMs today with different focuses:

AgentSight (covered in the eBPF series): observes agents that call external APIs. It hooks SSL to see the plaintext of HTTPS calls to the remote LLM, plus stdio for local MCP servers. The client view.
ProfInfer / the eBPF-on-local-inference pattern: observes the engine that runs the model locally. It hooks the engine’s internal functions (llama.cpp, vLLM) and the CUDA layer. The server (internal) view.

They are complementary. If your agent uses the Claude API plus your own local vLLM with Llama 3 for specific tasks, AgentSight sees the first, eBPF/ProfInfer sees the second. If everything is local, clearly the domain of the second. If everything is an external API, of the first.

Use cases for eBPF in local inference

Three cases where it is the right tool:

Fine-grained profiling for optimisation: your vLLM takes 50ms more per token than expected. With eBPF plus hardware counters you pin down which specific kernel it is. Previously this required Nsight Systems in a development session; now it is continuous in production.

Token-level observability without modifying the engine: capturing the stream of generated tokens before returning them to the client. Useful for auditing, for drift detection over the outputs, for local tracing without going through wrapper instrumentation.

Detecting specific degradation: a new version of vLLM introduces a subtle regression in paged attention. With perf counter baselines, you detect the change even if the external metric (tokens/sec) looks the same.

Part 2 — Statistical analysis of flows: detecting drift

Now to the other side of the problem: the time series.

Why tracing, evals and guardrails do not detect drift

The layers we have already seen operate on individual events:

Tracing: a trace of one conversation.
Evals: a score for one answer.
Guardrails: a verdict on one prompt or answer.
MCP observability: spans of one tool invocation.

Each one answers a point-in-time question (“is this all right?”). None of them answers the question of evolution (“is something changing over time?”).

The operational problem: drift is invisible in individual events. If the mean eval score drops from 0.92 to 0.85 over three weeks, no individual evaluation will raise an alarm, since they all continue to be “reasonable”. What changes is the distribution. And that only shows up when you look at many evaluations aggregated over time.

The three types of LLM drift in 2026

FutureAGI consolidates them like this, and the industry is converging on this vocabulary:

1. Prompt drift: someone updates the system prompt and the side effects break cases that used to work. Almost always intentional, but with unanticipated consequences. Detection: comparing response distributions before and after the change, monitoring eval scores per prompt version (linked in Langfuse, see the AgentSight post where we covered prompt management).

2. Model drift: the provider (OpenAI, Anthropic) updates the model without warning. The same prompt produces answers with a slightly different tone, similar but different quality, or degradation on some subset. Detection: comparing today’s response embeddings with the baseline; monitoring rubric scores; alerting if intra-model variance grows.

3. Eval-score drift: the rolling mean of your eval metrics (faithfulness, answer relevancy, custom rubrics) trends downwards. The root cause can be any of the above or a change in the user mix. Detection: alerts on the trends of the eval series.

To these three you can add a fourth, subtler one:

4. Persona drift / user mix shift: the population of users using the system changes. It is not that the model or the prompt got worse; it is that the new users ask different questions and the system, while still just as good at what it was good at, fails on the new material. Detection: embedding clustering of prompts, monitoring the appearance of new clusters or the growth of a minority one.

The key technical concept: embedding-space shift

Stack Pulsar puts it plainly: in LLMs, drift is best measured in embedding space. Classic distances in token space do not capture fine semantics; in embedding space they do.

The canonical pipeline:

Establish a baseline: during a stable period (say the first two weeks after a release), capture a large sample of prompt and response embeddings.
Continuous monitoring: every hour or every day, capture a new sample of production traffic.
Compare distributions: apply a statistical test that compares the current distribution with the baseline in embedding space.
Alert: if the divergence exceeds a threshold, fire an alert and an investigation workflow.

As a bonus, monitor clusters: if your baseline has 5 clusters of prompts (technical questions, general support, sales, and so on) and suddenly a sixth cluster appears that was not there, the most likely explanation is that a new user segment has arrived.

Statistical tests: KS, PSI, MMD

Three tests that any drift system uses, each with its place:

Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS): non-parametric. It computes the maximum distance between two empirical CDFs. It returns a statistic and a p-value. Advantage: very sensitive to subtle changes, especially in the tails. Disadvantage: with large datasets it is “too sensitive”, firing alarms for changes that are real but clinically irrelevant.

Population Stability Index (PSI): you bin the reference distribution and the current one, then sum (p_actual - p_ref) × log(p_actual / p_ref) over the bins. The canonical interpretation: PSI < 0.1 stable, 0.1-0.25 mild drift, > 0.25 significant drift. Advantage: interpretable, threshold-based, with a tradition of use in credit scoring (Capital One, Goldman Sachs). Disadvantage: less sensitive than KS, so it misses drift in the tails.

Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD): measures the divergence between two distributions by embedding each one in a Hilbert space via a kernel. It works for complex multivariate distributions (high-dimensional embeddings). Advantage: the only one that scales reasonably to embeddings of 768/1024/4096 dimensions. Disadvantage: harder to interpret.

The recommended practice in 2026:

PSI for simple features (prompt length, tokens, number of tools invoked).
KS for continuous features where you want high sensitivity.
MMD for embeddings (high-dimensional spaces).

Evidently’s analysis on real datasets showed that KS detects drift 6+ hours earlier than PSI in some incidents. The operational consequence: use KS for early warning, PSI for confirmation with an interpretable threshold.

Tools in 2026

Three products dominate the field:

Evidently AI

Evidently is open-source (Apache 2.0), Python-first. Its value:

HTML drift reports: you generate a report comparing two datasets (reference vs current) and you get an HTML file with all the statistical tests, visualisations and conclusions. No server, no infrastructure; one shareable file.
Native LLM support: on top of tabular, it supports text. It computes embeddings and applies the appropriate tests.
100+ metrics in the suite. It covers everything from a single framework.
Integration with MLflow and kube: CI workflows with reports on every release.

from evidently import Report
from evidently.metrics import DataDriftPreset

ref = load_baseline_dataset() # prompts from last week
cur = load_current_dataset() # prompts from the last hour

report = Report(metrics=[DataDriftPreset()])
report.run(reference_data=ref, current_data=cur)
report.save_html("drift_report.html")

When this functionality detects drift, it also tells you which column and which test fired.

NannyML

NannyML has a different focus: estimating model performance when you have no ground truth. The techniques:

CBPE (Confidence-Based Performance Estimation): estimates accuracy using the model’s confidence in its predictions.
DLE (Direct Loss Estimation): estimates the loss directly.

Useful when your LLM app has no immediate human feedback but you want to know whether its quality has dropped. Apache 2.0, Python.

WhyLabs

WhyLabs is commercial (with whylogs as the underlying OSS library), aimed at enterprise production:

Managed SaaS with SOC 2 Type 2 and HIPAA compliance.
Real-time monitoring via continuous log ingestion.
Embedding tracking: native support for embedding distributions, not just tabular features.
Token probability shifts: it monitors the probability distribution of generated tokens, not just metadata.

For regulated companies that do not want to operate their own drift detection platform, it is the lowest-friction option.

Other mentions

Arize Phoenix (seen in the Evals post) includes drift detection as a module. Galileo has commercial products specialised in LLM monitoring. Fiddler AI and Alibi Detect (Seldon) are more generalist alternatives that also cover LLMs.

Tool	Licence	Focus	Typical stack
Evidently AI	Apache 2.0	Drift reports + LLM	OSS Python, HTML reports
NannyML	Apache 2.0	Performance without GT	OSS Python, batch
WhyLabs	Commercial (whylogs OSS)	Enterprise SaaS, embeddings	Continuous logs, compliance
Arize Phoenix	ELv2	Tracing + drift unified	OSS, OTel-native
Galileo	Commercial	Premium LLM monitoring	SaaS, ML expert team
Alibi Detect	Apache 2.0	General drift detection	OSS Python, Seldon ecosystem
Fiddler AI	Commercial	Explainability + monitoring	Enterprise SaaS

Part 3 — The complete stack: how everything fits

Let us recap the layers the two series have covered, ordered from closest to the individual request to closest to the aggregate trend:

Individual EVENTS Aggregated TRENDS
│ │
Tracing ──→ Evals ──→ Guardrails ──→ MCP obs ──→ Drift detection
│ │
AgentSight ──→ Tetragon ──→ Hubble ──→ eBPF on-device
│ │
(what happens) (what changes)

Each layer answers a different question:

Layer	Question it answers	Granularity
Tracing (Langfuse, AgentSight)	What exactly did the agent do?	One session
Evals	Was the answer good?	One answer
Guardrails	Is this prompt/answer safe?	One message
MCP observability	Which tools did it invoke, at what cost?	One tool call
eBPF on agent/network (AgentSight, Hubble)	How did the system behave?	Per process/connection
eBPF on the local engine (ProfInfer-like)	How did the model execute?	Per runtime function
Drift detection	Is something changing silently?	Distribution

None of them replaces the others. Full coverage requires all seven. The practical operation:

Layers 1-3 (tracing, evals, guardrails) are mandatory from day one. Any LLM app in production that does not have them is flying blind.
Layer 4 (MCP) becomes mandatory when there are agents with tools, which is the majority in 2026.
Layers 5-6 (eBPF) become valuable when the scale justifies the operating cost (>10 services, >100 inference pods).
Layer 7 (drift) is the one that is most neglected and most expensive to ignore: it takes a day’s work to get the basic pipeline and it saves weeks of future incidents.

The operational drift pattern in 2026

The minimum recipe any serious LLM app should have:

Step 1 — Establish a baseline

During a stable post-release period (2 weeks minimum), store:

Embeddings of every prompt (vector + metadata: timestamp, user_segment, tenant).
Embeddings of the responses.
Automated eval scores over a sample (e.g. 5-10% of traffic with G-Eval).
The distribution of tools invoked (which tools, with which typical arguments, at what frequency).

Storage: any vector store plus a relational one. Reasonable cardinality at whatever scale you have.

Step 2 — Continuous comparison pipeline

Every hour (or every day depending on scale):

Take the sample for the current period (the last hour).
Apply the statistical tests against the baseline:
- PSI over simple features (prompt length, tokens, num tools).
- KS over continuous features (latency, score).
- MMD over embeddings.
Generate a drift report (Evidently does it in one line of Python).

Step 3 — Alerts and investigation workflow

Configure thresholds and routes:

PSI > 0.25 over tokens consumed: moderate alert (it may be legitimate, investigate segments).
Significant MMD over prompt embeddings: high alert (a change in user mix or a coordinated attack).
Eval rubric score down >5% over a rolling 7d: critical alert.
A new cluster in embedding space accounting for 10%+ of traffic: a review workflow (it may be a legitimate new segment or an anomaly).

Every alert must lead to a drill-down dashboard with the affected segments, not to an empty Slack message. The operational rule: if someone cannot investigate the alert in <5 minutes, it will not get investigated.

Step 4 — Baseline refresh

The baseline is not static. Every N weeks, refresh the baseline by incorporating the “new stable”. If over 3 months the usage pattern has legitimately changed (more international users, new languages), the baseline must reflect it. The typical cadence: quarterly.

Operational traps

A contaminated baseline

You take the baseline from a period that already contained the problem in embryo. Result: the baseline includes the bad behaviour and the tests never fire. Solution: verify the baseline against a second independent sample (for example, the first week vs the second) before blessing it.

A threshold that is too low

PSI > 0.05 fires constantly. Your team learns to ignore the alerts. Calibrate thresholds against the natural noise of your system: run the system with the baseline plus successive weekly samples and measure the PSI distribution; set the threshold a couple of deviations above normal.

Embeddings that are not representative

You use OpenAI’s text-embedding-3-small embedding model to detect drift in a system serving technical questions in Spanish about Cisco networks. Result: the embedding model does not capture the fine semantics of the domain. Solution: use embeddings finetuned for your domain, or one that is strong in multilingual and technical material.

Storage overload

Storing an embedding of every prompt in production at scale (millions of prompts/day) fills disks and increases cost. Stratified sampling: keep 5-10% of traffic, but make sure minority segments are over-represented so you do not lose them.

Confusing drift with “the system works”

Sometimes drift is good drift: new users discover the agent knows how to do X, and suddenly 30% of traffic is for X. The distribution changed because the product found a new use. Before pulling the alarm, check whether the change is desirable.

Privacy in embedding storage

Embeddings can be partially inverted back to their original text with embedding inversion techniques. If the prompts contain PII, storing embeddings for months for drift detection is a leak vector. Encrypt at rest and rotate regularly, or work with aggregated/averaged embeddings.

eBPF in production without profile guardrails

Attaching uprobes to hot-path functions such as llama_decode can hit throughput if it is not done carefully. Always test in staging and monitor the overhead. ProfInfer reports <4%; what you measure may vary with your binary and kernel.

Closing the two series

This week we have written 12 articles that walk the modern LLM inference stack in production from top to bottom:

LLM inference series (4 articles):

KV cache: the working memory that holds up LLM inference — fundamentals.
vLLM on Kubernetes — the engine.
PagedAttention deep dive — how it works inside.
LLM Operators on Kubernetes — orchestration.

eBPF series (4 articles):

eBPF from zero to Cilium — the substrate.
Tetragon — runtime security.
Hubble — network observability.
AgentSight — agent observability.

Post-tracing series (4 articles):

Evals — reactive quality.
Guardrails — preventive safety.
MCP observability — the tool protocol.
This one — drift detection and eBPF in local inference.

If you read the twelve in order you have a reasonably complete map of what it takes to operate AI agents in serious production in 2026, with enough detail not to crash into the usual problems in the first month. And, above all, with the mindset that LLM observability is a stack, not a product: each layer solves a problem, none of them solves all of them, and the combination is what separates an operable system from one that holds up until the first incident.

What is left for future series

MLOps specific to LLMs: continuous fine-tuning, RAG over data lakes, agent training.
Constitutional AI and alignment at runtime: how the model self-regulates with internal guardrails.
GPU networking: InfiniBand, NCCL, GPUDirect, the angle we left untouched.
Edge inference: llama.cpp on phones, MLX on macOS, Snapdragon NPU.
Theoretical inference scheduling: CFS-like algorithms applied to multi-tenant LLM serving.

We will cover them in time. That is it for now, and thanks for reading these twelve posts. If they gave you something, share them with a colleague.

References

eBPF in local inference:

ProfInfer: An eBPF-based Fine-Grained LLM Inference Profiler (arxiv 2601.20755) — the 2026 reference paper.
Monitor LLM Inference in Production 2026 (Glukhov) — Prometheus + Grafana for vLLM/TGI/llama.cpp.
AI Inference Server Observability in Kubernetes (ARMO) — the four signals MLOps tools do not capture.
vLLM vs llama.cpp: Choosing the right engine (Red Hat).

Drift detection concepts:

Tools:

Evidently AI (GitHub) — open-source.
Evidently — official site.
NannyML — performance without ground truth.
WhyLabs — managed observability.
Alibi Detect (Seldon) — general drift detection.
Arize Phoenix — drift integrated with tracing.

Statistical tests:

Data drift detection: PSI vs Kolmogorov–Smirnov (MLPipeline) — a practical comparison.
Population Stability Index for Model Drift Detection.
Which test is the best? 5 methods to detect data drift (Evidently) — the 6 hours of advantage for KS.

Cross-references (the three complete series):

LLM inference series: KV cache, vLLM on K8s, PagedAttention, LLM K8s Operators.
eBPF series: eBPF from zero to Cilium, Tetragon, Hubble, AgentSight.
Post-tracing series: Evals, Guardrails, MCP observability.

MCP from the inside and its deep observability: the LSP of AI agents and how to see everything with OpenTelemetry

Wed, 20 May 2026 06:00:00 +0200

TL;DR

Model Context Protocol (MCP) is the standard Anthropic published at the end of 2024 and which by 2026 has become the dominant protocol for connecting AI agents to external tools and data. Its value, the reason the whole industry adopted it in under 18 months, is that it solves a combinatorial problem: before MCP, integrating M AI apps with N tools required M×N ad-hoc integrations; with MCP, M + N. It is the same move the Language Server Protocol made in 2016 for code editors. The architecture is three well-defined roles, Host (the AI app), Client (the connection, one per server) and Server (the piece that exposes capabilities); the primitives are six, three on the server side (Tools, Resources, Prompts) and three on the client side (Sampling, Roots, Elicitation); the protocol is JSON-RPC over two transports, stdio for local processes and Streamable HTTP for remote. The operational challenge appears when there are 10-20 MCP servers running simultaneously, each with several tools, connected to an agent that chains multistep calls: observing what happens, where things fail, how much each tool costs, which tenant invokes what becomes critical. The ecosystem’s answer in 2026: the new OpenTelemetry GenAI semantic conventions for MCP (already stable), trace context propagation via params._meta (because JSON-RPC does not bring it natively), FastMCP with built-in OTel instrumentation, MCP Gateways as a centralised layer (Traefik Hub, MintMCP, OpenObserve), and MCP Inspector for interactive debugging. This article walks the architecture from the outside in, puts each concept in its exact place, and goes down to the detail of observability: traces, RED metrics, real use cases and pitfalls.

This is the third post in the post-tracing series. Previous posts: Evals and Guardrails. Here we go down to the protocol that connects agents to tools, and how to see it in production.

The master analogy (in three versions)

MCP is a communication protocol. Like any protocol, it is best understood with the right analogy. I am going to give you three, because each one lights up a different facet and the combination leaves you understanding it better than any technical definition.

Version 1 — The USB-C of AI apps (the official one)

This is the analogy Anthropic adopted when presenting it. Before USB-C, every electronic device had its own connector. Your phone had microUSB or Lightning, your laptop a proprietary power port, your headphones a 3.5mm jack, your external disk USB-A at one end and mini-USB at the other. The result: three boxes full of specific cables that got lost, none of them good for two things, and buying a new device meant buying new accessories.

USB-C changed that. A single physical connector that many protocols cross: data (USB 3, USB 4, Thunderbolt), video (DisplayPort), power (Power Delivery), audio. You connect anything to anything and it works; the protocols negotiate above.

MCP plays the same role for AI apps. Before MCP, every application that wanted to integrate tools with an LLM, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, in-house custom agents, invented its own way of doing it. Every tool vendor had to write N different integrations, one per app. The result: massive fragmentation, a lot of duplicated code, integrations that broke when an app changed its internal API.

With MCP, the connector is one: any app that speaks MCP can use any MCP tool. Just as your USB-C talks to printers, monitors and disks without the printer “knowing” whether the cable is connected to a Mac or to a Linux box.

Version 2 — The LSP of code editors (the most technically precise)

This is my favourite because the analogy is structurally identical, not just metaphorical.

Until 2016, if you wanted your code editor to support a new language, Rust, Go, TypeScript, somebody had to write a specific plugin for your particular editor. VSCode had its Rust plugin, IntelliJ a different one, Vim another, Emacs another. Every decent feature (go-to-definition, autocompletion, refactoring) was an implementation duplicated N times. M editors × N languages = M·N integrations.

In 2016 Microsoft proposed the Language Server Protocol (LSP): each language implements a single “language server” (a process that understands that language); each editor implements a single LSP client; when you work with Rust code in VSCode, VSCode launches rust-analyzer as a subprocess and talks LSP to it over stdio. Any LSP editor + any LSP server = it works. M + N.

MCP is literally this pattern, transferred from “editor + language server” to “AI app + tool provider”. And it shares even the technical detail: both pass JSON-RPC over stdio (among other transports). When Anthropic designed MCP, they looked at LSP. Anyone coming from the world of editors and IDEs will find MCP familiar.

Version 3 — The operating system driver (the operational one)

Finally, an analogy that helps you understand what a specific MCP server does.

An operating system does not know directly how to talk to your particular HP LaserJet printer. What it knows is a generic interface: “print document”, “query status”, “cancel job”. The printer driver is the piece that translates that generic interface into the proprietary commands of your specific printer.

An MCP server does exactly the same:

Your AI agent knows a generic interface: invoke a tool with a defined schema, read a resource by URI, ask for a prompt template by name.
The MCP server is the driver: it translates those generic operations into the concrete APIs of the underlying system, your PostgreSQL database, your filesystem, your GitHub API, your Stripe.

This leaves the AI agent free from knowing how it authenticates with GitHub, what exact SQL PostgreSQL uses, what endpoints Stripe has. It speaks MCP; the server takes care of the details.

With the three analogies combined: MCP is the layer between the LLM and the world, a standard USB-C implemented like LSP in JSON-RPC, with each server acting as a driver for one concrete underlying system.

What concrete problem MCP solves

Before going down to the architecture, it is worth pinning down the specific problem MCP solves, because without that many design decisions look arbitrary.

The problem is the quadratic cost of integrations.

Imagine you have M applications that use LLMs (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, ChatGPT Desktop, your own custom agent, and so on) and N external tools those LLMs could use (filesystem, GitHub, Slack, PostgreSQL, Jira, Notion, and so on). Without a standard:

Each (application, tool) pair requires a specific integration.
Every time the application changes its internal API, N integrations have to be updated.
Every time the tool changes its API, M have to be updated.
For your new tool to be adopted, you have to write M integrations.
For your new application to support the ecosystem, you have to write N.

The real result in 2023-2024: massive fragmentation. OpenAI’s function calling was not compatible with Anthropic’s tool use; every framework (LangChain, LlamaIndex, dspy) had its own wrapper; Claude Desktop plugins did not work in Cursor; and so on.

MCP breaks the quadratic. Each application implements the protocol once; each tool implements the protocol once; any pair works. M + N.

It is exactly what happened with USB-C, with LSP, with SQL (before there were proprietary APIs per database), with POSIX (before there were proprietary APIs per operating system). The pattern repeats because it always solves the same kind of problem.

The architecture: three roles, clearly placed

We are going to pin down where each thing lives, because mixing up the roles is the number one source of confusion in MCP.

Three roles. Let us pin down what each one does and where it physically lives.

Host: the AI application

The Host is the application the user opens. Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, ChatGPT Desktop, a custom agent your team builds, a VSCode extension. What the user perceives as “the product”.

The Host is responsible for:

Deciding which MCP servers to connect (configured by the user in a file or via the UI).
Launching or connecting to each MCP server.
Creating one MCP Client per server (it is 1:1, they are not shared).
Embedding the LLM (or calling it via API) that takes the decisions about which tools to use.
Mediating the user’s authorisation for sensitive actions (showing the human “the agent wants to run tool X, do you allow it?”).

Important: the LLM lives inside the Host, not in the servers. The servers are dumb; they execute operations when asked. The reasoning (“should I call this tool now?”) lives in the host’s LLM.

Client: the connection, one per server

An MCP Client is a specific connection between the Host and a Server. If your Host has 5 MCP servers configured, it has 5 clients, not one shared. Each client:

Maintains its socket or stdio pipe with the server.
Negotiates capabilities in the initial handshake (which protocol version, which primitives both support).
Serialises JSON-RPC requests to the server and deserialises responses.
Is the point where the Host invokes operations on the server.

The 1:1 client-server separation matters because it lets each server have its own session state, its specific permissions and its independent authenticated context. There is no multiplexing in the client.

Server: the piece that exposes capabilities

The MCP Server is the piece that implements the tool-provider side of the protocol. It receives JSON-RPC from the client, processes it, executes the action against the underlying system and returns a response.

There are two flavours physically:

Local server: it starts as a subprocess of the Host and communicates over stdio. Its lifecycle is the Host’s (when you close Claude Desktop, the local servers die). Typical model: your Host launches node filesystem-mcp-server.js as a child.
Remote server: it runs as an independent service, reachable over HTTP. Multi-tenant, authenticated, scalable. Typical model: a company publishes https://mcp.acme.com/v1 and many hosts connect to it.

This difference has enormous consequences for observability (we will come back to it shortly).

Summary of where each thing lives

Component	Lives in	How many there are	Speaks what with whom
Host	User’s machine	1 (the open app)	UI with the user; launches clients
LLM	Embedded in the Host (or cloud API)	1 (the main one)	Reasons; asks for tools
Client	Host	1 per server	JSON-RPC with its server
Local server	Subprocess of the Host	1 per local integration	stdio with its client
Remote server	External service	1 per service	HTTP/SSE with its clients
Underlying system	External	Depends	API/DB/FS, not MCP

If you get confused in a discussion, come back to this table. The number one source of errors in MCP is saying “the server” when you mean “the host”.

The two layers of the protocol

MCP separates the data layer and the transport layer. This separation is what lets the protocol work over local stdio and over remote HTTP without changing anything in the primitives.

Data Layer: JSON-RPC with MCP extensions

The data layer defines the vocabulary of the messages. It is JSON-RPC 2.0. Each message is a JSON with jsonrpc: "2.0", a method (eg tools/call, resources/read), params, and an id to correlate request with response.

On top of JSON-RPC, MCP adds:

Lifecycle: the initial handshake (initialize, initialized) that negotiates capabilities.
The primitives (next section): tools/*, resources/*, prompts/*, sampling/* and so on.
Notifications: messages without a response (eg notifications/cancelled to abort a tool in progress).
Meta-information: the params._meta field carries cross-cutting metadata by convention (trace context, request IDs).

Transport Layer: how the messages move

The transport layer defines how the JSON-RPC messages travel. Two official transports:

stdio: the client launches the server as a subprocess and they communicate over its stdin/stdout/stderr with JSON-RPC. One message per line, separated by a newline. No network, no TLS handshake, no auth (trust is inherited from the operating system itself: if you launch the subprocess, you trust it). Minimal latency (~100 μs round-trip), maximum bandwidth (memcpy, not a socket).

Use case: local servers that live on the same machine as the host. Most of the MCP servers you see in public directories are stdio.

Streamable HTTP: the client sends a POST to an HTTP endpoint on the server; the server responds with JSON, optionally opening a Server-Sent Events stream to send asynchronous notifications or long responses. Auth by bearer token, API key or custom headers.

Introduced in the November 2025 spec, it replaces the pure SSE transport of earlier versions, which had bidirectionality limitations. Use case: remote servers serving many simultaneous clients, with authentication and multi-tenancy.

Important: the primitives are the same on both transports. A tools/call is identical over stdio and over HTTP. The transport is accidental, not fundamental.

The six primitives: placed in the architecture

Here is the meat. There are six primitives in MCP. They are often confused because several look like they do similar things. The key classification: three live on the server side (the server exposes, the client consumes) and three on the client side (the client exposes, the server consumes).

Server-side: what the server gives the host

Tools are actions the server exposes. Each tool has a schema (typed parameters, description) and an implementation. When the host’s LLM decides to invoke a tool, the client sends tools/call to the server, which executes it and returns a result.

Example: the github-mcp server exposes create_issue(repo, title, body). The host’s LLM decides “I am going to create an issue”, calls this tool, github-mcp talks to the GitHub API, returns the issue ID to the LLM.
Architectural place: the server exposes them, the LLM consumes them.

Resources are contextual data the server exposes, addressable by URI. They are not actions; they are content reads. A resource has a URI (file:///path/to/doc.md, postgres://table/users), metadata and an endpoint to read content.

Example: the filesystem-mcp server exposes the files in the authorised directories as resources. The LLM asks for resources/read with the URI file:///docs/api.md and gets the text.
Architectural place: the server exposes them, the host reads them (and optionally passes them to the LLM as context).

Key difference between Tools and Resources: Tools are verbs (they execute, they modify state, they have side effects); Resources are nouns (they exist, they are read, they are idempotent). If you have something that is “search for text in files” → probably a Tool (an action). If it is “this specific file” → a Resource. The distinction matters for auditing and permissions: tools require more control.

Prompts are parameterised prompt templates the server exposes. The user or the host can invoke them to inject a conversational pattern into the model.

Example: a code-review-mcp server exposes a prompt review_diff(diff_text, style="strict") that returns a complete, well-written prompt asking the LLM to review code.
Architectural place: the server exposes them, the user or the host invokes them, the LLM receives them as input.

Prompts are the least used of the three primitives; many servers do not even implement them. But they let a team publish good prompts as a reusable library, separate from the agent.

Client-side: what the host gives the server

This is where MCP differs from protocols like HTTP REST: the server can also ask things of the host, it is not a one-way street. Three primitives travel in that direction.

Sampling: the server asks the host to run a generation with its LLM. That is, the server borrows the host’s LLM in order to reason.

Example: the search-mcp server receives a query from the agent, searches its corpus, finds 50 results and needs to summarise them before returning. Instead of having its own LLM, it sends a sampling/createMessage to the client; the host passes this to its LLM, runs the generation with the user’s permissions, and returns the summary to the server.
Architectural place: the server asks for it, the host (with its LLM and the user’s authorisation) fulfils it.
Why it matters: the user controls which model is used, what cost is paid, what permissions apply. The server does not need its own OpenAI API key.

Roots: the host tells the server where to look. Roots are URIs (directories, repositories, namespaces) the host authorises the server to explore.

Example: your Claude Desktop starts filesystem-mcp with roots [file:///Users/me/projects]. The server knows it must only operate inside that folder, not in /etc/passwd.
Architectural place: the host declares them in the handshake, the server respects them.

Elicitation: the server asks the host for additional information from the human user via a structured UI.

Example: the stripe-mcp server is about to process a refund of €5000. Before executing, it sends an elicitation/createMessage to the client; the host shows the user “Confirm this €5000 refund” with a button; when the user confirms, it returns OK to the server, which then proceeds.
Architectural place: the server asks, the host shows the user, the user decides, the answer goes back to the server.
It is the key primitive for human-in-the-loop on sensitive actions.

Visualising the flow of the six primitives

 HOST SERVER
│ │
Server-side ─────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
tools/list ──────┼─────── asks what tools exist ──────▶│
│◀────── returns the list ────────────│
│ │
tools/call ──────┼────────── run this tool ───────────▶│
│◀────── result ──────────────────────│
│ │
resources/read ──┼────────── read this URI ───────────▶│
│◀────── content ─────────────────────│
│ │
prompts/get ─────┼─────── give me this prompt ────────▶│
│◀────── compiled prompt ─────────────│
│ │
Client-side ─────┼─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
sampling ────────│◀────── I need a generation ─────────│
│── use my LLM ───┐ │
│── returns ──────▼──────────────────▶│
│ │
roots ───────────┼───── declared in the handshake ────▶│
│ │
elicitation ─────│◀────── ask the user X ──────────────│
│── shows UI ────┐ │
│── confirms ────▼───────────────────▶│

JSON-RPC in action: a concrete example

To make the theory concrete, here is a real MCP conversation between a client and the filesystem-mcp server:

// 1. Initial handshake (client → server)
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize",
"params": {
"protocolVersion": "2026-03-01",
"capabilities": {
"sampling": {}, // this client supports sampling
"roots": { "listChanged": true }
},
"clientInfo": { "name": "ClaudeDesktop", "version": "1.2.0" }
}
}
// 2. The server responds with its capabilities
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "result": {
"protocolVersion": "2026-03-01",
"capabilities": {
"tools": { "listChanged": true },
"resources": { "subscribe": true, "listChanged": true },
"prompts": {}
},
"serverInfo": { "name": "filesystem-mcp", "version": "0.5.2" }
}
}
// 3. The client asks for the list of tools
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/list"
}
// 4. The server returns its tools with a schema
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "result": {
"tools": [
{
"name": "read_file",
"description": "Read a file from the filesystem",
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": { "path": { "type": "string" } },
"required": ["path"]
}
},
{ "name": "write_file", "description": "...", "inputSchema": {} },
{ "name": "list_directory", "description": "...", "inputSchema": {} }
]
}
}
// 5. The LLM decides to call read_file; the client sends tools/call
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 3, "method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "read_file",
"arguments": { "path": "/Users/me/projects/notes.md" },
"_meta": { // ← the extension where trace context will go
"traceparent": "00-abc123...-def456-01"
}
}
}
// 6. The server returns the file content
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 3, "result": {
"content": [
{ "type": "text", "text": "# My notes\n\n..." }
]
}
}

The important thing to note: params._meta. That is the bag where MCP conventionally passes cross-cutting metadata, including trace context. We will come back to it shortly.

The observability problem: why traditional tracing is not enough

So much for theory. Let us go down to the operational problem: in a 2026 production cluster, a typical agent has 5-15 MCP servers connected simultaneously, each with 5-20 tools, and each conversation with the agent can generate dozens of chained tool calls. Without observability, debugging incidents is impossible.

Why generic tracing (Hubble, OTel without MCP conventions) is not enough:

Stdio is not visible on the network. Local servers talk over OS pipes. Your Hubble or your Datadog APM see nothing; there are no packets to capture. AgentSight (seen in the previous post in the eBPF series) with stdiocap captures it but gives you the raw JSON-RPC, without semantic context (which tool it is, which resource, which prompt).

Generic HTTP does not understand MCP either. If you trace the HTTP to a remote MCP server without MCP conventions, you see a POST to /v1 with an opaque JSON-RPC body. You lose “which tool was invoked”, “what arguments”, “was it elicitation or sampling”. RED metrics per endpoint are no use to you; you need RED per tool.

JSON-RPC does not propagate trace context natively. Unlike HTTP (the W3C traceparent header) or gRPC (metadata), JSON-RPC has no standard field for trace context. If you do not propagate it, every call to the server starts a new trace disconnected from the agent’s trace.

Multistep multi-server is very hard to follow. A single user conversation can translate into: 1) a call to github-mcp get_pr; 2) a call to filesystem-mcp read_file for several files; 3) a call to the main LLM with all the context; 4) a call to postgres-mcp query; 5) a call to slack-mcp send_message. Without propagated trace context, those are five disconnected traces. With propagation, it is one tree.

The solution: OpenTelemetry semantic conventions for MCP, already stable in 2026.

OpenTelemetry semantic conventions for MCP

The GenAI MCP semantic conventions are the set of standardised attributes for MCP-related spans and metrics. They were published as part of the GenAI subgroup of the OpenTelemetry SIG and are the first part of the GenAI semantic conventions to reach stable.

Why MCP-specific semantic conventions

Before they existed, teams instrumented MCP with the generic RPC semantic conventions (the ones you would use for gRPC or XML-RPC). It half worked. The MCP-specific conventions add:

Attributes to identify which primitive was executed (mcp.method.name = "tools/call").
Attributes to identify which specific tool/resource/prompt was touched (mcp.tool.name, mcp.resource.uri, mcp.prompt.name).
Attributes for the bidirectional flow (sampling/elicitation requests from the server to the client).
Attributes for the handshake (mcp.protocol.version, mcp.client.name, mcp.server.name).
Standardised RED metrics per tool (mcp.tool.call.duration, mcp.tool.call.errors).

The canonical attributes

The attributes any MCP-aware instrumentation should emit:

Attribute	Meaning	Example
`mcp.method.name`	JSON-RPC method	`"tools/call"`
`mcp.tool.name`	Name of the tool	`"read_file"`
`mcp.resource.uri`	URI of the resource	`"file:///docs/api.md"`
`mcp.prompt.name`	Name of the prompt	`"code_review"`
`mcp.session.id`	MCP session ID	`"sess-abc123"`
`mcp.protocol.version`	Protocol version	`"2026-03-01"`
`mcp.client.name`	Client identity	`"ClaudeDesktop/1.2.0"`
`mcp.server.name`	Server identity	`"filesystem-mcp/0.5.2"`
`mcp.transport`	Transport used	`"stdio"` or `"http"`
`mcp.error.code`	JSON-RPC error code	`-32602` (Invalid params)
`gen_ai.usage.input_tokens`	Tokens consumed (if sampling)	`1240`
`gen_ai.usage.output_tokens`	Tokens generated (if sampling)	`512`

The last two come from the generic GenAI semantic conventions and apply when the MCP call involves sampling (the server using the client’s LLM).

RED metrics per tool

Beyond spans, the semantic conventions define three core metrics:

mcp.tool.call.duration (histogram): the latency of each invocation.
mcp.tool.call.count (counter): the total number of invocations.
mcp.tool.call.errors (counter): errors per tool.

Labelled with mcp.tool.name, mcp.server.name, mcp.client.name. Pivotable in Grafana to answer “which tool is the slowest”, “which tool fails most”, “which client loads which server hardest”.

Trace context propagation: the `params._meta` trick

JSON-RPC has no headers like HTTP, so MCP cannot use the W3C traceparent header directly. The solution the ecosystem has converged on: propagate trace context in params._meta.

When the MCP client sends a tools/call, its OTel instrumentation does:

import json
from opentelemetry.propagate import inject

carrier = {}
inject(carrier) # fills it with traceparent/tracestate from the active span

params = {
 "name": "read_file",
 "arguments": {"path": "/notes.md"},
 "_meta": carrier, # ← propagates trace context
}

When the server receives it, it does the symmetrical thing:

from opentelemetry.propagate import extract

ctx = extract(request.params.get("_meta", {}))
with tracer.start_as_current_span("tools/call", context=ctx):
 # this span is a child of the client's
 return execute_tool(request.params)

The result: the server’s span is a child of the client’s span in the trace tree. When you look at the trace in Tempo or Phoenix, you see the whole chain: user → host → client → server → execution → response → client → host → response to the user.

This requires both ends to instrument consistently. If the server does not extract the context, you see disconnected spans but at least you have traceability on the client side.

Instrumentation patterns

There are three routes to instrumenting MCP, in increasing order of effort:

1. FastMCP with built-in OpenTelemetry

FastMCP is one of the most used Python frameworks for building MCP servers. It ships built-in OpenTelemetry instrumentation: every tool, resource template and prompt operation generates spans automatically with the correct MCP conventions.

from fastmcp import FastMCP
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace.export import OTLPSpanExporter

mcp = FastMCP("my-server", otel_endpoint="https://otel-collector:4318")

@mcp.tool()
def search_docs(query: str) -> str:
 """Search the corpus for matching documents."""
 # this automatically generates a span with
 # mcp.tool.name=search_docs, mcp.method.name=tools/call, etc.
 return run_search(query)

Zero instrumentation code. Spans with the correct conventions. It is the recommended pattern if you are starting an MCP server in Python from scratch.

2. Manual OpenTelemetry SDK

For servers that already exist or are in other languages (TypeScript, Go), the option is to instrument manually with the standard OTel SDK and emit the conventional MCP attributes:

from opentelemetry import trace
tracer = trace.get_tracer(__name__)

async def handle_tools_call(req: JSONRPCRequest):
 ctx = extract_trace_context(req)
 with tracer.start_as_current_span("mcp.tools.call", context=ctx) as span:
 span.set_attribute("mcp.method.name", "tools/call")
 span.set_attribute("mcp.tool.name", req.params["name"])
 span.set_attribute("mcp.server.name", "filesystem-mcp")
 try:
 result = await execute_tool(req.params)
 return result
 except Exception as e:
 span.set_attribute("mcp.error.code", -32603)
 span.record_exception(e)
 raise

More boilerplate but it works with any existing server.

3. MCP Inspector for interactive debugging

MCP Inspector (official) is a tool for interactive protocol-level debugging. It launches a local proxy (port 6277) between your client and the server, and opens a web UI (port 6274) where you see every JSON-RPC message back and forth in real time.

It is not production observability, it is development and debugging. But it is irreplaceable during the bring-up of a new server: you see exactly which requests arrive, which responses are returned, which errors occur. It saves hours of ad-hoc logging.

MCP Gateways: the centralised piece for enterprise

When your organisation has many agents connecting to many MCP servers, managing the connection matrix becomes operationally serious. The natural question, “can there be a proxy in front of all the MCP servers that centralises auth, rate limiting, logging and observability?”, already has an answer: MCP Gateways.

An MCP Gateway is a proxy that:

Accepts MCP connections from the hosts/agents.
Routes them to the corresponding backend MCP servers.
Applies centralised authentication and authorisation (which agent can call which tool).
Applies rate limiting per agent, per tool, per tenant.
Observes: it emits OTel metrics for every operation passing through.
Propagates the identity of the agent to the backend server (with several models: token forwarding, token exchange, impersonation).

The options that have established themselves in 2026:

Traefik Hub MCP Gateway — from the Traefik team. Declarative configuration, native integration with Traefik’s Kubernetes/Helm ecosystem.
MintMCP — a gateway focused on observability and multi-tenancy. SaaS and self-host.
OpenObserve MCP Gateway — integrated with the OpenObserve observability platform.

For small deployments (one team, few agents) a Gateway can be overkill. For enterprise (dozens of agents, dozens of servers, regulated compliance), it is practically mandatory.

Real use cases for MCP observability

Let us land this with five cases where properly instrumented MCP observability delivers immediate value:

1. Audit per tool, per tenant, per agent

Question: “who ran the delete_repo tool last month?”. Without MCP observability, impossible. With OTel conventions + identity propagation: a query in your trace backend filtering by mcp.tool.name="delete_repo", grouping by mcp.client.name or by the user_id propagated in _meta. Compliance happy.

2. Cost per tool and per tenant

Question: “how much does each tool cost?”. If the tools invoke external APIs (Stripe, OpenAI sampling) or consume significant resources (a GPU for an inference tool), knowing their aggregated cost matters. With mcp.tool.call.duration + gen_ai.usage.* aggregated by tool and tenant, you build cost accountability dashboards without instrumenting anything extra.

3. Debugging multistep chains that fail

Question: “the agent failed to complete this task, where did it go wrong?”. The propagated trace connects: the user’s span → the LLM’s span with its CoT → the spans of each tool invoked → the final LLM span. If the chain broke at the third tool, in Tempo you see the red span with the specific error message. Reproducing the failure is trivial.

4. Tool latency and degradation

Question: “which tool is degrading?”. RED metrics per tool in Grafana show p95/p99 latency over time. When a tool starts climbing from 200ms to 800ms (because the underlying service is collapsing), you see it before the users complain.

5. Detecting loops and agentic anomalies

Question: “is any agent stuck in a loop?”. If an agent calls tools/call read_file 80 times in 30 seconds for the same path, something is clearly wrong. An alert on mcp.tool.call.count grouped by (session_id, tool_name) detects this. Combined with loop detection at the reasoning level, it closes the circle.

Operational pitfalls

Lack of identity propagation

Your Gateway authenticates the agent, but passes requests to the backend without propagating identity. The result: the backend’s logs say “service-account” for everything, and it is impossible to audit who invoked what. Choose a propagation strategy early: token forwarding (simple, exposes tokens to the backend), token exchange (more secure), or impersonation with cross-logging.

Stdio servers that do not show up in your APM

This is the field’s number 1 pitfall. Your Cursor agent uses filesystem-mcp over stdio; you see nothing in Datadog because there is no network traffic. Solution: instrument the stdio server with an OTel SDK that exports over OTLP to your collector (via gRPC or HTTP; the OTel collector can receive even though the server talks stdio to its client). Or use AgentSight stdiocap to capture the raw JSON-RPC and process it offline.

Multiple protocol versions in production

Different clients use different MCP versions simultaneously. Your metrics dashboard mixes apples and oranges. ALWAYS label with mcp.protocol.version and filter/group by it.

`_meta` lost when passing through a proxy

Your Gateway accepts the client’s request, rewrites it for the backend, and forgets to copy params._meta. The result: the trace is broken at the Gateway, two disconnected traces. Make sure your Gateway preserves or re-injects trace context at each hop.

Trace volume with chatty servers

Some MCP servers emit many small operations (filesystem listings, partial reads). Without sampling, they fill your backend with useless traces. Apply tail-based sampling that keeps complete sessions or keeps only traces with errors or high latency.

Cardinality in metrics

mcp.tool.call.duration with mcp.session.id as a label blows up cardinality. Do not include unique per-session IDs in labels; keep cardinality under control with labels that take few discrete values (tool name, server name, client name, error code).

Confusing client and server spans

When you look at the tree, distinguish: the client sees the total latency from its perspective (network included); the server sees only its own work. If you look only at the server span to debug the latency perceived by the user, you miss the RTT. Use both.

What we have not covered

Experimental WebSocket MCP transport: an alternative to Streamable HTTP, not yet standard.
MCP servers in cloud-native deployments with sidecars: an emerging pattern of deploying MCP servers as pod sidecars.
MCP federation: composing several servers as one (similar to GraphQL federation).
eBPF + MCP: how AgentSight’s stdiocap and Cilium’s hooks complement native instrumentation.
MCP testing and contract tests: how to validate that your server complies with the spec.

References

Specification and concepts:

Model Context Protocol — sitio oficial — entrada canónica.
MCP architecture overview.
Transports — MCP docs.
MCP Inspector (GitHub) — debugging interactivo.

OpenTelemetry GenAI MCP:

Semantic conventions for Model Context Protocol — OpenTelemetry — referencia normativa.
Adding OpenTelemetry Trace Support to MCP (Discussion #269) — historia de la propuesta.
How to Instrument MCP Servers with OpenTelemetry (OneUptime).
How to trace MCP server tool calls with OpenTelemetry and Elastic APM.
MCP Observability with OpenTelemetry (SigNoz).
Distributed tracing for agentic workflows (Red Hat Developer).
OpenTelemetry for AI Agents in MCP Workflows (MintMCP).

Frameworks and gateways:

FastMCP OpenTelemetry — instrumentación built-in.
Traefik Hub MCP Gateway — gateway de Traefik.
MintMCP — gateway con foco en observabilidad.
OpenObserve MCP Gateway guide.
What is an MCP Gateway (DEV Community).
OpenTelemetry MCP Server (Traceloop) — el patrón inverso: usar MCP para que agentes consulten traces OTel.

Cross-references:

Post anterior: Guardrails y safety.
AgentSight y el nuevo tracing de LLMs — donde se introdujo stdiocap para capturar stdio de servidores MCP locales.
Evals: la capa después del tracing.

AgentSight and the new LLM tracing: zero-instrumentation with eBPF against Langfuse, LangSmith, Phoenix and company

Tue, 19 May 2026 18:00:00 +0200

TL;DR

Observing an LLM agent in production in 2026 splits into two approaches with opposite philosophies. The instrumented one, dominant until 2025, lives in tools such as Langfuse, LangSmith, Arize Phoenix, Helicone, OpenLLMetry/Traceloop or Pydantic Logfire: you install an SDK, decorate your calls, emit spans with the OpenTelemetry GenAI convention (gen_ai.request.model, gen_ai.usage.input_tokens, and so on) and export them to a backend. Enormous depth when you control the code; zero visibility when the agent is an opaque binary you run without instrumenting. The zero-instrumentation one, which AgentSight popularised in the second half of 2025, turns the perspective 180º: it puts eBPF hooks on the uprobes of the SSL/TLS libraries and captures the plaintext of every HTTPS request before encryption, without touching the app’s code, with less than 3% overhead and the guarantee of being tamper-proof (the agent cannot falsify what is seen in the kernel). Combined with BPF capture of stdio for local MCP servers, AgentSight gives you complete observability of any agent, including closed binaries such as Claude Code, Gemini CLI or Cursor, on a Kubernetes cluster. The two families are not enemies: the 2026 reference stack combines both (instrumented for your own apps with LangChain, eBPF for opaque binaries and tamper-proof compliance) over OpenTelemetry GenAI semantic conventions as the common vocabulary the ecosystem is stabilising this year.

This is the fourth and last post of the eBPF series. Part 1: eBPF from zero to Cilium. Part 2: Tetragon: runtime security. Part 3: Hubble: network observability. Here we close the circle with the semantic dimension: what an AI agent does, not only what network it opens or what syscalls it emits.

The analogy: traditional APM vs network sniffer

Anyone who has operated enterprise applications knows the two tribes of monitoring. The APM tribe (New Relic, AppDynamics, Datadog APM): you install an agent or an SDK in each application, mark spans, collect traces with enormous depth inside each process, down to lines of code, SQL queries, Java methods. The wire-level tribe (network sniffers, SolarWinds NPM-style tools, NetFlow): it does not touch the application; it observes the cable, sees protocols, latencies, retransmissions, identifies problems the app does not know it has.

Each one sees different things and both are useful. Anyone who has lived through a serious incident where APM said “all green” while users suffered knows that wire-level would have caught the problem (a saturated middlebox, a badly configured MTU, a TCP timeout). Anyone who has tried to debug a memory leak with sniffers knows it was impossible without APM.

LLM agent observability in 2026 is exactly at this point. The APM-style has been in place for a couple of years: Langfuse, LangSmith, Phoenix, OpenLLMetry. Enormous depth, requires instrumenting the app. The wire-level with eBPF has just arrived: AgentSight is the first project to take it to production. Less depth inside the agent, but it sees any agent without touching anything and it is tamper-proof. Both are useful. The industry is in full coexistence.

Why observing LLM agents is different

Before getting into tools, it is worth pausing on what makes LLM agents specific as subjects of observability:

Non-determinism. The same input can produce different outputs. Reproducing an incident requires capturing exactly the conversation, the model, the parameters and, ideally, the seed. An aggregate “p95 latency” metric falls short; what you need is replay of the individual trace.

A chain of external invocations. A typical agent calls LLM → tools (tool calling) → MCP servers → other APIs → back to the LLM. A chat session can generate dozens of chained calls that have to be correlated by trace_id to understand the decision.

Cost linear in tokens. Every call is paid for in tokens. Without tracing input/output tokens per request, you cannot assign cost to a tenant or a team, nor detect loops that eat your budget in an hour.

Semantic risk. Prompt injection (a user input containing instructions to manipulate the model), jailbreaks, secret leakage through tool calls. It is a class of problem that does not appear in traditional applications, and observability must see it.

Opaque binaries. In 2026, many teams deploy third-party agents such as Claude Code, the Cursor agent, Aider, Gemini CLI or Codex CLI as internal tools. They are not your own applications; they are closed binaries that call the vendor’s API. Instrumenting them is impossible. Observing them requires something else.

Multi-agent and orchestration. More and more architectures have agents that invoke other agents (planner → executor → critic). Observability must understand the topology, not just the individual span.

With these five points in mind, the tools we are about to see differ mainly in which parts of the problem they cover well and which parts they leave blind.

The instrumented approach: how it works

The model is direct and familiar:

Your code calls the LLM or the tools using an official library: openai, anthropic, langchain, llama_index, dspy.
You install a tracer SDK (Langfuse, LangSmith, OpenLLMetry, Logfire) that wraps or monkey-patches those libraries.
Each call emits an OpenTelemetry span with standardised attributes: model used, input/output tokens, latency, parameters, messages, tool invoked, result.
The spans are exported over OTLP to a backend that shows them as a tree of traces.

# Typical example with OpenLLMetry + any SDK
from traceloop.sdk import Traceloop
from openai import OpenAI

Traceloop.init(app_name="my-agent", api_endpoint="https://otel-collector:4318")

client = OpenAI()
# this call automatically emits a span with
# gen_ai.request.model, gen_ai.usage.input_tokens, etc.
resp = client.chat.completions.create(
 model="gpt-4.1",
 messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "..."}]
)

What you see afterwards: a dashboard with each conversation as a trace, each call as a span, the complete prompts and completions (if you opt in), the computed cost, latencies per span, errors flagged.

OpenTelemetry GenAI semantic conventions: the common vocabulary

The fragmentation of the field is being mitigated with OpenTelemetry GenAI Semantic Conventions. It is the CNCF’s effort to get all tools to emit spans with the same attribute names:

gen_ai.system — the provider (openai, anthropic, vertex_ai, and so on).
gen_ai.request.model — the model requested (gpt-4.1, claude-3-5-sonnet).
gen_ai.response.model — the model actually used (sometimes it differs, e.g. fallbacks).
gen_ai.usage.input_tokens and gen_ai.usage.output_tokens — counters.
gen_ai.request.temperature, gen_ai.request.top_p, and so on — parameters.
gen_ai.response.finish_reasons — why it ended (stop, length, content_filter).
gen_ai.operation.name — the type of operation (chat, embedding, completion).

In early 2026, the client spans moved from experimental to stable. The rest (server spans, multi-agent events) is still in development. The operational meaning: if your SDK emits these attributes, any backend that understands OTel GenAI can consume them. Moving from Langfuse to Phoenix to Helicone does not imply re-instrumenting, only changing the exporter.

The SIG is actively developing conventions for multi-agent systems: agent teams, tasks, actions, memory, artifact tracking. This is what is missing for complex agent architectures to have a common vocabulary. In 2026 it is experimental; stabilisation is expected at the end of the year or the start of 2027.

Instrumented tools: the 2026 landscape

Tool	Licence	Self-host	Focus	Where it shines
Langfuse	MIT	Yes	LLM observability + evals + prompt mgmt	Best OSS balance, complete suite
LangSmith	Commercial	No	Native LangChain/LangGraph	If you use LangChain, zero-config integration
Arize Phoenix	ELv2 (OSS)	Yes	OTel-native, strong RAG	Vector DBs, retrieval, embeddings
Helicone	Commercial + OSS lite	Yes (lite)	Simple proxy	Setup in minutes, OpenAI-only
OpenLLMetry / Traceloop	Apache 2.0	Yes	OTel SDK for LLMs	Vendor-neutral, exports to any OTel backend
Pydantic Logfire	Commercial	No	App + LLM unified	If you use Pydantic AI, native integration
Weights & Biases Weave	Commercial	Limited	Experimentation + production	If you already use W&B for training
Laminar / Braintrust	Commercial	No / Yes	Evals + tracing	More recent, focused on evaluation

Deep dive: Langfuse

It is worth pausing on Langfuse because in 2026 it is the default choice among the open-source options and the one most teams have adopted this year. It is a YC W23 project, MIT licence, and keeps a sustained release cadence with serious architectural changes between versions.

Four declared pillars: observability (tracing), evaluations, prompt management, playground/datasets. Each one separately has complete commercial products behind it; Langfuse integrates them into a single platform with a single backend.

SDK v4: OTEL-native, not a replacement

The big recent operational change is the SDK v4, a thin layer over the official OpenTelemetry client. The choice is deliberate: instead of maintaining a client of its own that would fall behind the OTel primitives, Langfuse uses the standard SDK and enriches the spans with LLM-specific attributes and helpers. The consequence: any code already instrumented with vanilla OpenTelemetry (@opentelemetry/sdk-node, opentelemetry-sdk in Python) can export to Langfuse without major changes, and the other way round, if tomorrow you want to migrate from Langfuse to another OTel backend, the spans are portable.

In Python the idiomatic decorator is @observe:

from langfuse import observe, get_client

langfuse = get_client()

@observe()
def buscar_documentos(query: str):
 # any internal call is traced as well
 return vector_store.similarity_search(query)

@observe(as_type="generation")
def llamar_llm(prompt: str):
 # marked as "generation" so it appears with LLM metadata
 return openai_client.chat.completions.create(...)

@observe()
def pipeline_rag(pregunta: str):
 docs = buscar_documentos(pregunta)
 return llamar_llm(build_prompt(pregunta, docs))

The call tree is captured automatically: the trace shows pipeline_rag as the root span, with buscar_documentos and llamar_llm as children, nested. Without writing a single with tracer.start_as_current_span(...) by hand.

In TypeScript the equivalent is modular: you install @langfuse/tracing, @langfuse/otel and @opentelemetry/sdk-node, and you can use TS decorators, context managers or manual spans, the three models interoperate. The consequence: third-party libraries that emit OTel spans (openai, @anthropic-ai/sdk, Vercel AI SDK instrumentations) show up in Langfuse with no extra work.

Self-host architecture: designed for serious production

The Langfuse backend architecture has two explicit decisions that set its self-host deployment apart:

Persistence in S3/Blob Storage first. When a tracing event arrives, it is persisted in object storage before touching the database. Only when the later processing confirms OK is it inserted into Postgres/Clickhouse. If the DB goes down temporarily, the events are not lost; they stay in S3 waiting to be reprocessed. For production where losing the traces of an incident is equivalent to losing evidence, this is load-bearing.
Long migrations as background jobs. Schema upgrades that on other platforms mean a downtime window run in the background on Langfuse while the application keeps serving. Upgrade downtime drops drastically.

The officially supported deployment modes:

Docker Compose: for development and POCs. One command, everything up.
VM: a single node, containers, no orchestration. For small environments.
Kubernetes with Helm: the recommended mode for production. Official chart maintained. Supports external Postgres, external Clickhouse, external S3, HPA.

The external dependencies in a typical production setup: Postgres (metadata, prompts, configuration), Clickhouse (tracing events, high-cardinality queries), S3 or a compatible blob store (pending events), Redis (the queue between components). Yes, that is several pieces; it is what holds up the durability and the scale.

Prompt management as a first-class citizen

What sets Langfuse apart from platforms focused only on tracing is that the prompts live in Langfuse, not in the application repo or in spreadsheets. Each prompt has:

Name and version (v1, v2, v3…). Changing the prompt does not require redeploying the app: the app asks the SDK for the prompt, and the SDK caches it and refreshes when there is a new version.
Typed variables: {{user_input}}, {{context}}. Rendering with validation.
Tags and labels: by environment (production, staging), by team, by experiment.
Client and server cache: the SDK caches locally with a configurable TTL, avoiding a roundtrip to Langfuse on every call.
Linkage with traces: each trace records which exact version of which prompt was used. Investigating “this answer came out wrong” leads to prompt version Y, not to “some version of the prompt at some point”.

from langfuse import get_client

langfuse = get_client()

prompt = langfuse.get_prompt("rag-system-prompt", version=3)
# or by label: langfuse.get_prompt("rag-system-prompt", label="production")

compiled = prompt.compile(context=docs_text, user_input=question)
# 'compiled' is the final string, ready to send to the LLM

For teams iterating on prompts daily, this is what avoids the chaos of “which version of the prompt is actually running in production right now”.

Evaluations: four combinable evaluation models

Langfuse covers the four patterns of answer evaluation:

LLM-as-a-judge: you configure a model (typically GPT-4 or Claude) with a rubric and it evaluates each answer. Result: a numeric score (0-1) and a justification. Applicable to automatic tracing (all answers) or batch (a dataset selection).
User feedback: the app lets the user mark an answer as good/bad. The feedback is associated with the trace and the prompt version, which lets you see which versions have a worse rate.
Manual labeling: a UI where human labelers score answers. Useful for golden datasets and for evaluating the judge.
Custom evaluators through the API/SDK: your own evals (a unit test, a business metric) report a score through the API. They integrate with CI.

Combined, they give regression testing of the prompt: you change from v3 to v4, evaluate the golden dataset with LLM-as-judge, compare; if v4 gets worse in any of the segments, the merge fails.

Integrations

Langfuse does not compete with OpenLLMetry, LangChain or LiteLLM: it integrates them. The ones that are tested and documented:

OpenTelemetry: any OTel instrumentation emits to Langfuse over OTLP.
LangChain and LangGraph: a native callback that captures the whole chain.
LlamaIndex: native callback.
OpenAI SDK (Python and TS): a wrapper that adds tracing automatically.
LiteLLM: integration as a callback, which covers 100+ providers through LiteLLM.
OpenLLMetry / Traceloop: they emit to Langfuse like any OTel backend.
MLflow: through an OTel exporter from MLflow to Langfuse.
Vercel AI SDK: native instrumentation.

The strategy is clear: Langfuse is a backend, not an SDK. Your team chooses how it instruments; Langfuse accepts any path. The operational consequence: moving from Langfuse to another OTel backend tomorrow is viable.

When Langfuse is not the answer

So as not to present it as a silver bullet:

If you only use LangChain and have no resources to self-host: LangSmith will give you a smoother integration (it is the same team).
If your only need is a proxy with cost tracking and no evals: Helicone is simpler.
If you want an integrated commercial vendor solution: Datadog LLM Observability, New Relic AI Monitoring or Dynatrace AI are Enterprise alternatives with 24/7 support.
If your load is pure batch massive inference with no agents: you probably do not need semantic tracing; Prometheus + Grafana with OTel metrics is enough.

For everything else, your own apps with serious tracing, multi-tenant with quotas, teams iterating on prompts daily, RAG with continuous evaluation, Langfuse is the safe bet.

Quick choice summary:

LangChain → LangSmith (zero effort, automatic instrumentation).
Your own multi-framework applications with OSS → Langfuse (MIT, self-host, complete).
RAG with vector stores → Arize Phoenix (better retrieval visibility).
Simple proxy, low budget → Helicone.
Strict vendor neutrality → OpenLLMetry/Traceloop.
Pydantic AI → Logfire (same team).

Strengths and weaknesses of the instrumented model

Strengths:

Enormous depth: nested spans with all the context (chain steps, retrieval, embeddings, tool calls).
Semantic vocabulary: the SDK knows the domain (LLM, vector store, agent).
Maturity: three years of evolution, a rich ecosystem, ready-made dashboards.
Built-in evals: the top platforms combine tracing with evaluation (judge LLM, datasets, regression).

Weaknesses:

Requires control of the code: if you cannot instrument, it does not work.
Trust in the app: if the app reports badly or has a bug, so does the trace. It is not tamper-proof.
Coupling to the SDK: version changes in a library can break the instrumentation.
Uneven coverage: Python SDKs are mature; Go, Rust and JS are younger.

The zero-instrumentation approach: AgentSight

AgentSight is the project from the eunomia-bpf group that champions the opposite approach. Its paper on arxiv (2508.02736), presented at the Workshop on Practical Adoption Challenges of ML for Systems, formalises the proposal. The premise is direct:

Instead of instrumenting the agent, observe it at the system boundary.

And “system boundary” means the kernel boundary: the last point before a piece of data leaves the process towards the network or the filesystem. There, with eBPF, things are seen as they are, without the application being able to cooperate in hiding them.

Architecture: three planes

AgentSight assembles three layers:

Plane 1 — SSL/TLS uprobes. eBPF can attach programs to functions in userspace libraries (uprobes). The target functions are the encryption ones: SSL_write, SSL_read from OpenSSL/BoringSSL, and their equivalents in Rustls. AgentSight puts hooks on them that capture the arguments: the plaintext buffer the app passes to be encrypted, just before TLS processes it. On reception it does the symmetric thing: a hook after SSL_read with the freshly decrypted plaintext. Result: AgentSight sees the complete content of any HTTPS request the app makes without needing a man-in-the-middle, certificates or traffic decryption. The payload is plaintext because it was captured before being encrypted.

This works because uprobes are cheap (around 100 ns per invocation) and because apps use common TLS libraries. The few apps that implement their own TLS (rare in production) escape this hook; for those you need a different kprobe or manual instrumentation.

Plane 2 — Kernel events. In parallel, AgentSight observes relevant syscalls through tracepoints: execve (which processes start), connect/accept (network), read/write with file descriptors (filesystem and stdio), unlink, clone. Any action by the agent that has an effect outside the process passes through here. This covers, among other things, shell commands executed by the agent: if a Claude Code agent decides to run rm -rf to “clean up the project”, the execve is seen even if the LLM API does not report it.

Plane 3 — Correlation engine. The two previous planes produce streams of asynchronous events. AgentSight has a userspace component that correlates them causally cross-process: an outgoing HTTP request with bash -c rm -rf can be correlated with the previous LLM response that suggested it, through PIDs, timings and heuristics. The paper mentions the optional use of a secondary LLM (Anthropic Claude, for instance) that analyses the sequence of events and produces semantic alerts: “the agent responded with a tool call that was not in the whitelist”, “the reasoning chain has gone 47 iterations without converging”.

`stdiocap`: capturing the stdio of local MCP servers

One specific piece that deserves its own mention is stdiocap, a separate BPF tool included in the repo. The Model Context Protocol (MCP), popularised by Anthropic in 2024 and mainstream in 2025-2026, has two transport modes: HTTP/SSE (network) and stdio (between the client and the server it starts as a subprocess). Local MCP servers, the ones that run on the same machine and are started by the client as children over pipes, communicate through stdin/stdout/stderr with JSON-RPC.

stdiocap hooks read/write/dup on the stdin/stdout/stderr file descriptors of a target process and records all the JSON-RPC traffic between the MCP client and server. It is the same idea as the SSL capture but for stdio: you observe the conversation without either the client or the server knowing. Typical use case: seeing which tools of the filesystem-mcp MCP server a Claude Code agent has invoked in the last hour, what arguments it passed, what errors it received. Impossible with classic instrumentation (MCP servers are usually third-party binaries).

Guarantees: tamper-proof, kernel safety, <3% overhead

Three properties make AgentSight interesting for production:

Tamper-proof: the observation happens in the kernel (uprobes, syscalls). A malicious or compromised application cannot falsify what is seen. Compare with instrumentation: if the agent decides not to emit the span for its action, it does not appear in Langfuse. Here it has no choice.
Kernel safety: eBPF formally verifies that programs terminate and respect bounds checks. It cannot crash the kernel. The same as in the rest of the eBPF series.
<3% CPU overhead measured on real agent workloads (per the paper). The number compares favourably with SDK instrumentation, which typically adds 5-10% in intensive applications.

What it detects out of the box

The paper and the documentation highlight three classes of detection:

Real-time prompt injection: the correlation engine can apply rules or a detection model over the plaintext captured by the SSL uprobes. If the prompt contains suspicious patterns, “ignore all previous instructions”, a system prompt embedded in a user input, instructions to exfiltrate data, it raises an alert.
Reasoning loops that burn resources: agents that enter infinite loops calling tools without progressing. Detectable because the causal chain does not converge to a “final answer” and the tokens pile up. The correlation engine flags them.
Bottlenecks in multi-agent setups: when several agents coordinate, AgentSight sees the communication matrix between all of them and can detect agents that block while waiting, deadlocks, excessive fan-out.

The clash and the coexistence

The two families look like competitors, but in reality they see different things and complement each other in production.

What only the instrumented one sees

Internal agent variables that never reach the wire: the intermediate state of a LangChain chain, the values before passing them to a tool, how a prompt is built from a template with internal vars.
Deep semantic spans: retrieval > embed > vector_search > rerank > format_context > prompt_template > llm. AgentSight sees only the final call to the LLM; the path taken to build it is invisible.
Evaluations: scoring of answers, judge LLMs, quality regression. This lives only in instrumented platforms.

What only eBPF sees

Opaque binaries: Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, third-party agents. You do not have the code; you cannot instrument them. Only eBPF sees them.
System-level actions: the agent decides to run git push --force or kubectl delete. The action is seen in the execve. The agent’s instrumentation may not report it (especially if it was a command the agent generated as output without going through an explicit “tool”).
Tamper-proof audit: for regulatory compliance (HIPAA, SOC2, NIS2), having observation the app cannot dodge has formal value. eBPF provides it.
Local MCP servers over stdio: invisible to classic instrumentation unless each server emits its own spans (rare).

What both see, complementarily

Prompts and completions: the instrumented approach emits them with rich metadata; eBPF captures them off the wire. A perfect cross-check for spotting discrepancies.
Calls to external APIs: APM flags it; eBPF confirms it at kernel level.
Latency: APM per span; eBPF measures RTT at TCP level and network connectivity.

Decision matrix

Case	Instrumented	eBPF (AgentSight)
Your own app with LangChain	Yes, first	Optional
Your own multi-framework app	Yes	Optional
Third-party binary (Claude Code, Cursor)	Does not work	Yes, the only path
Tamper-proof regulatory compliance	Insufficient	Yes, required
Zero-trust multi-tenant	Insufficient	Yes, required
Local MCP servers (stdio)	Difficult	Yes, with stdiocap
Answer quality evaluation	Yes, required	No (out of scope)
Depth of the internal chain	Yes, required	No (a black box for AgentSight)
Reasoning loop detection	Possible with plumbing	Yes, built in
Real-time prompt injection	Possible (post-processed)	Yes, in stream

The natural conclusion: for your own apps, instrumented; for opaque binaries or compliance, eBPF; for everything that matters, both.

2026 reference architecture

Four recipes that cover the bulk of real cases:

Setup A — Your own application with LangChain or similar

Needs: depth, evals, a team comfortable with SDKs.

Langfuse self-host or LangSmith cloud as the backend.
OpenLLMetry SDK or LangSmith SDK instrumenting the code.
OpenTelemetry Collector between the app and the backend for routing flexibility (to Langfuse + Tempo + Loki, for instance).
Hubble for the network layer in the cluster (inter-pod latency, drop attribution).

Setup B — Productionising an opaque binary (Claude Code, Gemini CLI)

Needs: observe without touching, audit, control cost.

AgentSight deployed as a DaemonSet over the cluster (or standalone on the node).
Grafana with dashboards fed by AgentSight’s metrics.
An OTLP exporter from AgentSight to an OTel backend (Tempo, Jaeger). The spans will use the GenAI semantic conventions once they are fully standardised.
Tetragon optionally for policy over what the agent is allowed to run (Sigkill if it tries rm -rf or similar).

Setup C — Zero-trust multi-tenant platform

Needs: agents from different clients running on the same cluster, mandatory audit, nobody trusts anybody.

AgentSight as the tamper-proof audit layer. Compliance requires it.
Langfuse multi-tenant for the clients that do instrument.
Tetragon with TracingPolicyNamespaced per tenant (different policies per namespace).
Hubble with persistent flow logs for forensics.
Cilium NetworkPolicy to isolate tenants from each other on the network.

Setup D — A local MCP server on a workstation

Needs: seeing what an agent does with a stdio MCP server.

AgentSight stdiocap pointed at the PID of the client or the server.
Complete JSON-RPC capture to a file or to an OTLP endpoint.
Visualisation: Grafana, or simply jq over the log.

A real use case: if you are integrating an MCP server of your own and want to see what tool calls a Claude Code or Cursor agent makes to your server, stdiocap is the cleanest way. You need to modify neither client nor server.

Operational traps

Sensitive data in prompts (instrumented)

By default, Langfuse, LangSmith and similar tools capture the complete content of prompts and completions. If your app processes PII, secrets or medical data, that goes to your observability backend. Configuring redaction or content opt-out before going to production is mandatory. OTel GenAI has specific flags (OTEL_INSTRUMENTATION_GENAI_CAPTURE_MESSAGE_CONTENT=false) to avoid it.

Sensitive data in prompts (AgentSight)

The same problem, worse: AgentSight captures literally what goes to the wire, in plaintext. If the agent talked to api.openai.com with a prompt containing sensitive data, AgentSight has that plaintext. You have to encrypt or redact before storing.

Pinned certificates or non-standard TLS

Some high-security apps do certificate pinning or use unconventional TLS implementations (Go’s crypto/tls, custom BoringSSL). In those cases, the uprobes on libssl do not cover them. AgentSight detects when it cannot observe and reports the gap; you still have to add specific hooks for the alternative SDK.

Token volume and storage

An application with medium traffic can generate millions of tokens a day. If you store them all in Langfuse or Phoenix with long retention, the database grows fast. Strategies: aggressive sampling, short retention for normal sessions and long retention only for errors/anomalies, content redaction and keeping only metadata.

Tracing with sampling and consistency

To cut cost, many installations sample: only 1 in every N traces is persisted. Be careful with inconsistent sampling: a trace can carry several spans across multiple services, and if the sampling decision is taken per span, you end up with incomplete traces. OTel has head sampling (in the SDK, at the start), which is consistent, and tail sampling (in the collector, at the end), which allows finer rules. For LLM, tail sampling is ideal: sample everything, discard only the “normal” traces and keep the ones with errors, high latency or high cost.

Multi-agent and trace propagation

When agent A calls agent B, you have to propagate the trace context (W3C Trace Context headers) so it shows up as a single tree. If you do not, you see two disconnected traces. Modern platforms do it automatically with inject/extract, but if your transport between agents is custom (over Redis pub/sub, over a DB), you have to propagate by hand.

The cost of uprobes on critical libraries

Hooking libssl adds around 100 ns per invocation. On extreme TLS traffic loads (tens of thousands of connections/s per core), that adds up. AgentSight keeps it under 3% on typical agent workloads (which are chatty but not networking-intensive). If your use were sniffing all the HTTPS on the node, it could hurt more.

What we have not covered (next series)

Evals: the next layer after tracing. Phoenix, Langfuse, LangSmith and company offer answer evaluation (judge LLM, datasets, regression). It is a world of its own.
Guardrails and safety: NeMo Guardrails, Llama Guard, Llama Prompt Guard, evaluators specific to prompt injection and jailbreaks.
Deep MCP server observability: how the OpenTelemetry GenAI conventions are being extended to MCP servers for trace-aware tools.
eBPF + on-device inference: when the LLM runs locally through vLLM or llama.cpp, the uprobes can see the output token queue BEFORE it goes to the client. New territory.
Statistical analysis of agent flows: detecting drift, outliers, patterns that indicate degradation.

Closing the eBPF series

This series of four articles has travelled eBPF from first principles to the 2026 frontier:

eBPF from zero to Cilium — what eBPF is, networking hooks, how Cilium skips the TCP/IP stack, BGP Control Plane v2.
Tetragon: runtime security — observability and enforcement of processes in the kernel.
Hubble: network observability — L3-L7 flow logs and the frontier with AI agents.
This one — AgentSight, LLM tracing, instrumented vs zero-instrumentation.

If you have got this far you have the map to sit down with a platform, security or AI team in 2026 and recognise what each piece does, what problem it solves and where to start. That whole stack, Cilium for CNI and BGP, Tetragon for runtime security, Hubble for network observability, AgentSight for AI agents, sharing eBPF as a common substrate, Cloud Native governance and OpenTelemetry vocabulary. It is the clean architecture the industry asked for a decade ago and that finally exists.

References

AgentSight:

AgentSight GitHub (eunomia-bpf) — the project.
AgentSight: System-Level Observability for AI Agents Using eBPF (arxiv 2508.02736) — the formal paper.
AgentSight ACM workshop publication.
AgentSight blog post (eunomia.dev) — accessible description.

OpenTelemetry GenAI semantic conventions:

Instrumented platforms:

Langfuse — MIT, self-host + cloud.
LangSmith — LangChain team.
Arize Phoenix — OSS, OTel-native.
Helicone — simple proxy.
OpenLLMetry (Traceloop) — Apache 2.0, OTel SDK.
Pydantic Logfire — AI observability.

2026 comparisons:

Cross-references from the series:

eBPF from zero to Cilium.
Tetragon: runtime security.
Hubble: network observability.
LLM inference series: KV cache, vLLM on Kubernetes, PagedAttention, LLM Operators on K8s.

Llm-Observability on lo0 — Tech Blog

eBPF in local inference and statistical drift detection: closing the LLM observability loop in 2026

TL;DR

The analogy: the agent’s cardiogram

Part 1 — eBPF applied to local inference

Why local inference changes the game

ProfInfer: the paper that formalises the pattern

Where to hook: the map by engine

llama.cpp

vLLM

CUDA in general

Hardware counters: the other half

Comparison with AgentSight

Use cases for eBPF in local inference

Part 2 — Statistical analysis of flows: detecting drift

Why tracing, evals and guardrails do not detect drift

The three types of LLM drift in 2026

The key technical concept: embedding-space shift

Statistical tests: KS, PSI, MMD

Tools in 2026

Evidently AI

NannyML

WhyLabs

Other mentions

Part 3 — The complete stack: how everything fits

The operational drift pattern in 2026

Step 1 — Establish a baseline

Step 2 — Continuous comparison pipeline

Step 3 — Alerts and investigation workflow

Step 4 — Baseline refresh

Operational traps

A contaminated baseline

A threshold that is too low

Embeddings that are not representative

Storage overload

Confusing drift with “the system works”

Privacy in embedding storage

eBPF in production without profile guardrails

Closing the two series

What is left for future series

References

MCP from the inside and its deep observability: the LSP of AI agents and how to see everything with OpenTelemetry

TL;DR

The master analogy (in three versions)

Version 1 — The USB-C of AI apps (the official one)

Version 2 — The LSP of code editors (the most technically precise)

Version 3 — The operating system driver (the operational one)

What concrete problem MCP solves

The architecture: three roles, clearly placed

Host: the AI application

Client: the connection, one per server

Server: the piece that exposes capabilities

Summary of where each thing lives

The two layers of the protocol

Data Layer: JSON-RPC with MCP extensions

Transport Layer: how the messages move

The six primitives: placed in the architecture

Server-side: what the server gives the host

Client-side: what the host gives the server

Visualising the flow of the six primitives

JSON-RPC in action: a concrete example

The observability problem: why traditional tracing is not enough

OpenTelemetry semantic conventions for MCP

Why MCP-specific semantic conventions

The canonical attributes

RED metrics per tool

Trace context propagation: the params._meta trick

Instrumentation patterns

1. FastMCP with built-in OpenTelemetry

2. Manual OpenTelemetry SDK

3. MCP Inspector for interactive debugging

MCP Gateways: the centralised piece for enterprise

Real use cases for MCP observability

1. Audit per tool, per tenant, per agent

2. Cost per tool and per tenant

3. Debugging multistep chains that fail

4. Tool latency and degradation

5. Detecting loops and agentic anomalies

Operational pitfalls

Lack of identity propagation

Trace context propagation: the `params._meta` trick

`_meta` lost when passing through a proxy

`stdiocap`: capturing the stdio of local MCP servers